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MINORS AND HEALTH CARE:
THE AGE OF CONSENT
By WALTER

WADLINGTON*

The appropriate age for removal of the various legal disabilities of
infancy has been the subject of both considerable discussion and substantial
legislative action during the past several years. In the United States, a recent
federal constitutional amendment has guaranteed the right of suffrage at
age 181 and some states have followed this federal step by lowering the age
of majority in general to coincide with the age for voting.2 Others have
followed a pattern of reconsidering age limitations for certain purposes, such
as marriage. Of particularly widespread concern has been the determination
of when medical care can be undertaken for a minor with his or her consent
rather than that of a parent. The last problem, by no means a new one,
increases in importance as children achieve greater independence earlier and
as providing medical care for minors becomes a more important goal in
today's health care oriented society.
The basic legal problem can be set forth briefly. The law of torts protects
us against unauthorized invasions of our bodies. Medical treatment without
consent thus becomes a trespass - what some courts have termed a "technical battery". 3 To be valid, any consent must be an "informed" one, 4 and it
must be given by a person with the requisite legal capacity. Thus, a physician
who proceeds with what he considers to be treatment in conformity with the
best interests of his minor patient, at that patient's request and with his
agreement, still might be proceeding without legal consent because the minor
may lack capacity to consent because of his age. When the particular treatment is a possibly controversial or emotionally charged one, such as fitting
an intrauterine device or prescribing birth control pills in order that a sexually
James Madison Professor, University of Virginia Law School.
'U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, was declared to have been ratified on July 5, 1971.
2
In Virginia, for example, the General Assembly in its 1972 session lowered the
age of majority to eighteen. Va. Code Ann. § 1-13.42 (Cum. Supp. 1972). One vestige
of the earlier law was retained: Although they may be adults who can marry and vote,
persons under twenty-one still cannot purchase alcoholic beverages other than beer.
Va. Code Ann. § 4-73.2 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
3 "A surgical operation on the body of a person is a technical battery or trespass,
regardless of its result, unless the person or some authorized person consents to it."
Younts v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. (1970), 205 Kan. 292, 469
P.2d 330 (Sup. Ct.).
4
The question of whether consent was "informed" - that is, whether the consenting party actually knew or had been fully apprised of the risks involved in the particular
procedure, and understood them, has been discussed elsewhere in this issue. For still
further treatment see J. Waltz and F. Inbau, Medical Jurisprudence (MacMillan, 1971)
at 152; McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment
(1957), 41 Minn. L. Rev. 381; Plante, An Analysis of Informed Consent (1968), 36
Fordham L Rev. 639; Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 103. The issue of "informed consent" could be relevant if the minor does not have
the actual capacity to understand the explanation, See discussion at text to note 51, infra.
0
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active minor can continue to have intercourse without fear of pregnancy, the
possible invocation of criminal sanctions for an offense such as contributing
to the delinquency of a minor also can be a very real threat.5
Two basic situations involving the unemancipated minor and the capacity
to consent to medical treatment have long been dealt with in Anglo-American
law. The first of these has led to the "emergency" exception, applicable to
both adults and minors. When immediate steps are necessary to effect life
saving measures or to begin with medication in severe cases and the appropriate person to authorize consent (who might be the injured party) is
unavailable or incapable of giving consent, it is generally recognized that the
battery.6
physician can proceed with treatment without fear of liability for
7
consent.
implied
an
on
based
is
exception
the
that
Some theorize
The second case involves the situation in which consent to treatment is
arbitrarily withheld by a parent. Such conduct, even though inspired by
religious conviction of the parent, can be categorized as "medical neglect"
if the courts so wish, and a substitute parent (not infrequently a hospital
administrator or public health official) may be appointed guardian for the
limited purpose of consenting to medical care. Broad statutory schemes long
have invested the courts with considerable latitude in determining the instances
in which withholding of consent will be considered "medical neglect". 8 However, courts, until recently, have seemed reluctant to invoke their substitute
parental authority except when failure to provide treatment had dire implications such as a threat to the life of the minor involved. 9 This doctrine of
judicial abstention seems to be undergoing considerable change; now we find
some courts willing to substitute their decisions for those of parents even at
times when major surgical procedures are proposed to remedy conditions
posing no physical threat to life. 10
8 There

also may be more specific prohibitions against such conduct. In New

Zealand it is still a criminal offense to sell or otherwise dispose of any contraceptive to
one below age 16. Police Offenses Amendment Act of 1954, Section 2, in Reprint of
New Zealand Statutes, Vol. 12, at 56.
0 For a general discussion of the emergency doctrine see I. Watlz and F. Inbau,
supra, note 4 at 169-72. See also Restatement of Torts 2d, § 62; Wells v. McGehee

(1949), 39 So.2d 196 (La. App.).

7As one commentator points out, however, it would seem more accurate to say
simply that the defendant was privileged. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts
(4th ed. St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1971 at 103.
8
See, e.g. The Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 64, s. 20(1)(b)(x).
0 See, e.g. In Re Tony Tuttendarlo (1912), 21 Pa. Dist. Reps. 561 (court would

not override parental refusal to consent to operation to avoid seven year old boy from
becoming a cripple); Matter of Selferth (1955), 309 N.Y. 2d 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (Ct.
of App.) (upholding parental refusal to allow operation to correct cleft palate); In re
Hudson (1942), 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765 (Sup. CL) (parental refusal to permit

amputation of club arm).

10The New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed a Family Court order appointing a guardian to consent to a serious (perhaps even life threatening) operation
on a fifteen year old boy to partially alleviate a facial deformity which had caused
him to remain out of school from age nine. In re Sampson (1970), 65 Misc. 2d 658,
317 N.Y.S. 2d 641 (Family Ct.), aff'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 253, aff'd,
(1972), 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918 (Appeal Ct.). But see,
In re Green (1972), 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. Sup. Ct.).
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In areas outside the emergency sphere and in cases not involving actual
witholding of parental consent, many courts and legislatures also have
responded to problems created by the parental consent requirement. The
pattern of such responses has varied considerably. The present comment will
seek to provide a general comparison of them and an evaluation of their
principal merits and deficiencies.
The "Mature Minor" Rule: A Creature of Necessity If Not Emergency

Judicial response to the harshness of a requirement of parental consent
for all medical care to minors has come largely through development of what
is widely labeled the "mature minor" rule. The effect of this rule is to allow
a subjective appraisal of at least some cases in which physicians proceed with
non-emergency medical care for minors with only the patient's consent. Two
recent cases and two older ones provide good illustrations of the circumstances
under which judges have been willing to invoke it.
In Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital," no parental consent had been
obtained by a dermatologist for non-emergency treatment of a 20 year old
male to remove facial marks caused by acne. The claimant asserted both
negligence and invasion of his body without appropriate consent. As to the
latter claim, Addy, J., of the Ontario High Court, pointed out that:
Although the common law imposes very strict limitations on the capacity of
persons under 21 years of age to hold, or rather to divest themselves of, property,
or to enter into contracts concerning matters other than necessities, it would be
ridiculous in this day and age, where the voting age is being reduced generally
to 18 years, to state that a person of 20 years of age, who is obviousy intelligent
and as fully capable of understanding the possible consequences of a medical or
surgical procedure as an adult, would, at law, be incapable of consenting thereto.12

In short, the court was willing to look at the capacity of the particular
"infant" under the given circumstances, here an elective operation performed

on one only months away from majority.
In Younts v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc.,'3 the

Supreme Court of Kansas was asked to hold that taking a skin graft from
the forearm of a 17-year-old girl to repair her injured finger was a battery
because the surgeon had not first secured parental consent. The girl's injury
had occurred when her hand was caught accidentally in the door of the
hospital room in which her mother had been placed following major surgery.
The mother, still semi-conscious from a general anaesthetic, was in no condition to consent. The girl's father, from whom the mother was divorced, lived
in another city 200 miles away and his address was unknown and not immediately available. The daughter was taken to the hospital's emergency room
where a repair operation and skin graft was effected.
Despite what apparently was a successful operation from a medical
standpoint, the daughter later sued the hospital alleging that taking a pinch
graft from her forearm was tortious because no parental consent had been
11 (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 139.
12 Id., at 144.
13 Younts v. St. FrancisHospital & School of Nursing, Inc., Supra, note 3.
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obtained. 14 To some it might seem that the court could have denied recovery
under the "emergency" exception. In any event, they elected not to do so,
but held that given the particular circumstances this 17 year old "was mature
enough to understand the nature and consequences and to knowingly consent
to the beneficial surgical procedure made necessary by the accident." The
court clearly took into consideration both the non-availability of either parent
and the fact that before the skin graft was effected the treating surgeon had
discussed the proposed procedure with the girl's regular family physician and
had obtained his approval (even though he had no more legal authority to
consent for the child than did the surgeon himself).
In dismissing the plaintiff's allegation of battery in the Younts case, the
Kansas court cited with approval an earlier Ohio decision in which an 18year-old girl had responded to a telephone directory advertisement which
urged readers to reshape their noses through plastic surgery. At an initial
interview with an agent of the defendant doctor the plaintiff stated that she
had no money, but she was assured that a loan could be obtained for her to
finance the cosmetic procedure. A date for the operation then was set and
she returned to the doctor's office. The girl's testimony, which made the
operation sound somewhat like an encounter with a mad acupuncturist, was
met with the doctor's own statement that she had told him that she was 21
years of age and that following the operation she had called at his office on
several occasions for follow-up treatment. An intermediate court reversed
the judgment of a trial court which had awarded damages for assault and
battery. The reversal was upheld on appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, which
affirmed Per Curiam but prepared an official syllabus.15 Two concurring
opinions also were written and variously joined in by members of the court,
evidencing a split in views on the issue of the age of consent; an opinion
joined in by four of the seven members, however, stressed that the trial court
had erred "in charging that a minor of 18 could not consent to what the
jury from the evidence might have determined was only a simple operation."'6
This view also was translated into the officially prepared syllabus.
A somewhat different problem was presented to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bonner v. Moran,1' the second
of our "older" cases. The plaintiff male, at age fifteen, had been hospitalized
for some two months and was permanently disfigured through serving as a
tissue donor for a severely burned cousin.
The request for the boy's participation as a donor had come from an
aunt of both children. At the time of the request, the boy's mother was ill
and she was not advised of the proposed medical procedure. After the boy
appeared at the hospital for a blood typing procedure he was admitted for
the first of a series of operations in which "a tube of flesh was cut and formed
14 The daughter also alleged that a nurse employed by the hospital had negligently
closed the door on her finger, causing the injury in the first place. This, of course, had
nothing to do with the question of consent.
15
Lacey v. Laird (1956), 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (Sup. Ct.). The plaintiff
had also alleged malpractice (negligence) but lost on this count in a directed verdict.
16 (1956), 166 Ohio St. 12 at 26, 139 N.E.2d 25 at 34. [emphasis by the court].
17 (1941), 126 F. 2d 121 (D.C. Cir.).
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from his arm pit to his waist line"18 and one end of the tube was attached to
his cousin. Unfortunately, the procedure turned out to be a failure. The boy
brought suit to recover for his disfigurement but the trial court refused to
instruct the jury that consent of both the boy and his mother was necessary,
instead telling them that "if they believed that [the plaintiff] himself was
capable of appreciating and did appreciate the nature and consequences of
the operation and actually consented, or by his conduct implicitly consented,
their verdict must be for the defendant."' 19 The appellate court held this
charge to be incorrect and reversed and remanded the case with the opinion
that consent of the parent should have been considered necessary. The
appeals court specifically noted its concern over the fact that the boy underwent the surgical operation for the benefit of another rather than for his own
health needs. 2 0
The preceding decisions, along with some half a dozen others,21 allow us
to draw certain inferences about the type of situation in which courts which
recognize the "mature minor" rule will be likely to apply it and dispense with
the requirement of parental consent. The cases in which the rule has been
applied generally have had the following factors in common:
(1) The treatment was undertaken for the benefit of the minor rather
than a third party.
(2) The particular minor was near majority (or at least in the range of
15 years of age upward), and was considered to have sufficient mental capacity to understand fully the nature and importance of the medical steps
proposed.
(3) The medical procedures could be characterized by the courts as
something less than "major" or "serious" in nature. 218 Id.

19 Id., at 122.
20 Id.,

at 123. Although they acknowledged that the question was not before them,

the court pointed out that it was possible that the mother could have ratified the treatment by her conduct after learning of it.
21 Gulf & Ship Island R. R. v. Sullivan, (1929), 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (Sup.
C.) (17 year old could consent to smallpox vaccination); Bishop v. Shurly (1926), 237
Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (Sup. Ct.) (19 year old could modify choice of anaesthetic);
Bakker v. Welsh (1906), 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (Sup. Ct.) (17 year old could
consent to surgery under particular circumstances); Zoski v. Gaines (1935), 271 Mich.
1, 260 N.W. 99 (Sup Ct.) (parental consent necessary for tonsillectomy on 9 year
old); Rishworth v. Moss (1917), 191 S.E. 843 (Tex. Civ. App.) (11 year old needed
parental consent for operation to remove adenoids and tonsils). Cf. Sullivan v. Montgomery (1935), 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.) (liberal construction
of emergency doctrine when patient twenty-one).
22
This, of course, is a difficult assessment to make, and treatments will vary in
potential danger according to the state of medical development. Several early cases
involved administration of anaesthetics at a time when the field of anesthesiology was
less developed and the possibility of harm was probably substantial. In any event, the
fact that the proposed procedure is a form of surgery does not necessarily mean it is
"serious" or "major". See e.g., Lacey v. Laird (1956), 166 Ohio St. 12 at 26, 139 N.E.
2d 25 at 31 (Sup. Ct.) (concurring opinion of Taft, I.).
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In a good number of the cases, it also seemed that the situation at least
bordered on one in which the emergency doctrine could have been invoked,
and it may be of some significance that the allegation of a battery frequently
accompanied a specific charge of negligence. As to the latter point, one may
question whether suit would have been brought in the first place simply for
the "technical" trespass unless a negligence action also were being filed.
A question to which few of the cases address themselves in detail is the
amount of damages allowable. In Lacey v. Laird, however, the court's syllabus stated that the defendant was entitled to an instruction that only nominal
damages could be awarded for the "technical" battery.23 Barring some particularly egregious or wanton conduct which might lead to an award of punitive
damages, the monetary exposure for battery rather than negligence may well
be small. Nevertheless, just the possibility of a legal action can serve as a
24
serious deterrent against extension of treatment by physicians.
The Work of the Legislatures
To date the legislative approaches aimed toward the problems of consent
for medical treatment of unemancipated minors can be placed within one or
25
more distinguishable categories:
(1) Statutes which provide for a hierarchy of persons or agencies from
which consent can be obtained in the event of parental absence or unavailability.20 Included in the order may be adult siblings, grandparents, or persons
standing in loco parentis,as well as juvenile and family courts. These statutes
have the advantage of providing the physician with a "laundry list" which he
can safely follow, but usually they have the disadvantage of not allowing him
to rely on the assent of a minor who may be as mature and competent as the
substitute parents whose consent will be legally effective.
27
(2) Restatements of the emergency exception with regard to minors.
23

Lacey v. Laird (1956), 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E. 2d 25 at 26 (Sup. Ct.).

The Court's syllabus defined "nominal damages" as being "limited to some small or

nominal amount in terms of money." Cf. Natanson v. Kline (1960), 186 Kan. 393, 350
P. 2d 670 (Sup. Ct.) (deals with measure of damages for failure to obtain informed
consent), discussed in J. Waltz and F. Inbau, supra, note 4 at 168.
24 Some physicians, for example, have refused to perform vasectomies on consenting adults for fear of later being faced with civil actions by patients who were steri-

lized effectively.
25The categories do not include general provisions lowering the age of majority,
or special provisions on emancipation not specifically aimed at the medical consent

problem.
26
See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann., Ch. 88-2904 (1971 Rev.) (Georgia also has a separate
provision on venereal disease and a codified emergency expection); Va. Code Ann.
§ 32-137 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
27
See, e.g. Mass. Gen. Stat. c. 112, § 12F (Cum. Supp. 1972); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 7129-83 (1966); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-21.1 to 90-21.4 (Supp. 1971), discussed in
Note (1971), 8 Wake Forest L. Rev. 148.
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(3) Codification of the judicially developed "mature minor" rule.28
(4) Limited emancipation statutes that permit minors to consent to
medical care when they have reached a particular age still short of majority,
or have married, or have become parents, or have "left home". 29 Reliance on
provisions such as the one last enumerated can sometimes be a precarious
venture. For example, has a boarding school or college student left home?
The effectiveness of such limited emancipation statutes also will vary accordhag to the specific bottom age which is set. In New York's new medical consent statute, for example, the age for medical consent is set at 18 for those
who are not either married or parents. 0 England, on the other hand, has set
the age of majority at 18, but has provided that minors nevertheless may
consent to "surgical, medical or dental treatment" when they have reached
only 16 years. 8 '
A number of the laws within this category contain fairly broad exculpatory provisions to protect the physician who acts in good faith on the representations of a particular minor that
he or she falls within the class of persons
32
eligible to give effective consent.
(5) Provisions for treating or counseling minors for certain specified
illnesses, conditions or health purposes. These laws, which usually contain
either a very low age for consent or no age floor at all,a3 typically have been
extended to include one or more of such matters as venereal disease, drug
addiction, or rehabilitation, pregnancy, childbirth, and family planning or
birth control.3 4 Some also extend to any reportable disease.s A question can
be raised as to whether treatment for pregnancy or birth control includes the
performance of an abortion; some statutes
have resolved this by specifically
excluding abortion from their purview. 80 However legislation dealing with the
28

MAiss. Code Ann. § 7129-81 (1966), for example, contains a general listing of
who can consent to medical care. Subsection h. includes:
Any unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate
the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures,
for himself.
29 For a general cataloguing of such provisions in the United States as of September
1971, see H. Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care (1972), 36 Albany L. Rev. 462
at 472-87.
30 N.Y. Public Health Law § 2504 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1972-73).
31 The Family Law Reform Act 1969 (1969 c. 46), § 1, 8.
82
See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann., Tit. 22, § 104 (21) (2) (Cum. Supp. 1972); N.Y.

Public Health Law § 2504 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
33 The Virginia law, as one illustration, extends to birth control, pregnancy (except
abortion), family planning and drug problems. It allows "any minor" to give effective
consent within these spheres. Va. Code Ann., Tit. 32, Ch. 8, § 32-137 (Cum. Supp.
1972). The Texas statute dealing with treatment for drug dependency or other drugrelated conditions provides that one 13 years or older has the capacity to consent to
examination and treatment. Tex. Civ. Stat. § 4447; (Cum. Supp. 1972).
34 For a list of the various provisions of this type which had been enacted by
September 1971, see H. Pilpel, supra, note 29. The statutory appendix to that article
places particular emphasis on those provisions dealing with pregnancy and birth control.
35
See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann., Tit. 22, §104 (17) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
38
6 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §32-137 (6) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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conditions for87 abortion usually contains specific age limitations and consent
requirements.
The statutes in this category clearly indicate a legislative recognition that
communications between parent and child, even when there has been no
semblance of legal emancipation, often may be strained or nonexistent on
some subjects. It is because of the fear that requiring a minor child to go to
his parent for consent may frustrate him from seeking medical care related
to drug use or early sexual activity that some jurisdictions have dropped all
age restrictions in these areas of concern. Some have taken even a further
step by forbidding the physician's disclosure to a parent that the consenting
minor is receiving treatment unless the minor himself agrees to such disclosure,s8 or at least insulating the physician from any duty to make such a
disclosure by giving him discretion in this regard.3 9 Another tack is to require
disclosure to parents only in cases where their minor40child is actually diagnosed as being pregnant or having a venereal disease.
The Alabama statute: One state's comprehensive approach
Among the statutes enacted to deal specifically with medical consent for
minors, Chapter IC of the Alabama Code is probably the most comprehensive in scope. It also ranges across several of the previously enumerated categories. As a general matter, consent to medical treatment can be given by one
who is fourteen or older or who "has graduated from high school, or is
married, or having been married is divorced, or is pregnant .... ,"41 Consent
can be given for "any legally authorized medical, dental, health or mental
health services for himself or herself .... " 4 2 Any minor, with no statutory age

floor, can consent to "legally authorized medical, health or mental health
services to determine the presence of, or to treat pregnancy, venereal disease,
drug dependency, alcohol toxicity or any reportable disease ....

, 43 The statute

44
grants minor parents authority to consent to health care for their children;
it also contains a broad emergency exception permitting treatment of minors
of any age without parental consent "when, in the physician's judgment, an
attempt to secure consent would result in delay of treatment which would
87 The Virginia abortion statute provides that if the woman is an infant (below 18
under present law, reduced from 21 when the abortion statute was enacted), permission
must be given "by a parent, or if married by her husband, guardian or person standing
in loco parentis ... " Va. Code Ann. §18.1 - 62.2 (Cum. Supp. 1972).

In New York, a 1972 law sets the age for consent to medical care at 18. The
abortion statute sets no minimum age and some hospitals previously had been willing
to permit abortions for persons 17 before enactment of the new law. See, H. Pipel,
supra, note 29 at 469; N.Y. Penal Code § 125.05 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
88
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19-496c (Cum. Supp. 1972).
39 See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 34.6 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
40
Hawaii Rev. Stat, Tit. 31, § 577A-3 (Cum. Supp. 1972). This applies to minors
below age eighteen. The information must be conveyed to the "spouse, parent, custodian
or guardian ... even over the express refusal of the minor patient."
41
Ala. Code Ann., Tit. 22, § 104 (15) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
42 Id.
43Id., at § 104 (17)
44Id., at § 104 (16)

(Cum. Supp. 1972).
(Cum. Supp. 1972).
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increase the risk to the minor's life, health or mental health"; 4r and furthermore exempts a physician from liability based on trespass if he has in good
faith acted on consent obtained by a minor who professed to be capable of
effectively assenting under the statute.46 It contains a legal safeguard for the
minor who might have a negligence action by stating that if he is not authorized to enter into binding contracts otherwise than by the medical consent
chapter he does not by its terms become legally entitled to waive
any right
47
or cause of action by virtue of the treatment he has received.
Other illustrations of the new style of comprehensive medical consent
statutes are found in 48
provisions recently incorporated in the state codes of
Illinois and Maryland.
Legislative and JudicialApproaches: A Brief Appraisal
The approach of the courts thus far has served the fairly narrow purpose
of providing an avenue for escape from the harsh results which can flow from
any absolute requirement of consent. Much of this judicial action took place
before the current round of legislation lowering the age for adulthood generally. To the extent that the mature minor rule might allow a physician to
subjectivise broadly about the maturity and capability of minors, there might
be potential for further expansion of the doctrine by the courts. Such a possibility seems quite unlikely in practice, however. We cannot overlook the fact
that often the circumstances surrounding the medical treatment in past cases
where the mature minor rule was invoked did clearly involve extenuating
circumstances. In any event, a requirement of subjective appraisal of the
capacity of each minor does not make for the degree of legal certainty which
physicians desire in order to protect themselves from the possibility of suit
for battery. At most, the present judicial approach thus seems likely to continue as an "escape hatch" for the hard case.
The legislative approach has the advantage of allowing for considerable
flexibility in dealing with the multiple problems related to minors and medical
care. As pointed out in the outline of the various statutory approaches to
date, different consent ages can be applied to different treatments. Such distinctions can be based either on the seriousness of the treatment or on the
concern for the social and medical problems associated with lack of treatment.
A carefully framed statute also can provide greater certainty for the physician
as to when he must obtain consent from someone other than the patient.
Special provisions excusing him for mistake caused by good faith reliance on
the patient's age representations can add a further margin of safety.
Ceding that the legislative approach permits greater flexibility, which
seems to be of more concern today than providing a means for resolving the
occasional close case, the question becomes one of determining just what
makes a fair and effective statute. Perhaps the most important policy interest
45 Id., at § 104 (18) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
46
1d., at § 104 (21) (Cur. Supp. 1972).
47 Id., at § 104 (22) (Cum. Supp. 1972).

48111. Rev. Stat (Smith-Hurd), c. 91, §§ 18, 1-7 (Cam. Supp. 1972); Md. Code
Ann. §§ 135, 135 A (Cum.Supp. 1972).
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which must be balanced against the goal of assuring timely and effective
extension of medical care to minors is the impact which shifting the discretionary power from parent to child (and sometimes very young child) may
have on the family unit as a functioning entity. States which have opted for
low or no age floors in specific areas such as sex and drug problems must be
considered to have decided that in a substantial number of cases the traditional decision making process of the family unit had broken down or was
somehow ineffective. Variations in the extent to which such statutes provide
for a parental "right to know" may be considered as some measure of the
degree of reliance on the family as a resource in dealing with such problems
once initial medical help has been obtained.
Some Remaining Problems
Even the most comprehensive of the medical consent statutes enacted to
date leave some legal problems unconsidered or unresolved.
Few of the new statutes address themselves in any detail to the respective
financial liabilities of parent and minor child. In instances in which the state
or some special program will pay, such uncertainty is not a problem. 49 But
this is by no means universally the case. Some statutes have made it clear
that a minor may not disaffirm contracts for medical care to which he can
consent under the statute. 0 However the parent's stated duty to provide
necessary care for his minor children usually has not been modified. Under
these circumstances, who will pay for medical procedures which are questionably either within the category of necessaries, or of purely cosmetic, elective
surgery (eg. a mammoplasty for a sixteen year old girl who wants larger
breasts)?
Seemingly the minor can be bound if he had authority to consent, but
what about the liability of the non-consenting parent; is it or should it be
joint, several, primary or secondary?
If a minor has the power to consent, then must his consent be obtained
as well as that of a parent? This is another area where the statutes are all
too frequently silent, and where the establishment of a very low age for consent can introduce a new element of uncertainty for the physician.
An even more serious problem is the extent to which the statutes have
failed to deal with the requirement of an "informed" consent. Although a
detailed discussion of this concept and questions such as whether failure to
adequately inform a patient of risks attendant to a particular treatment or
operation should be deemed a battery or negligence is beyond the scope of
this comment, 1 we must not overlook the serious ramifications which the
informed consent requirement can have when the patient is a minor. Let us
assume that a legislature has lowered the age of consent for medical treatment
to 12. Are we certain that even the majority of 12-year-olds can comprehend
49

Even in the absence of any form of national health system, this might be the

case when venereal disease or family planning is involved.
G0 See Calif. Civ. Code §34.6 (Cam. Supp. 1972); Colo. Rev. Stat. §41-2-13 (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
G1 See supra, note 4, for a list of authorities dealing with these problems.
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,and assess the risks involved in most medical treatment? Must there be a
special child's version of the explanation of proposed medical procedures
and their potential meaning for the patient? Although some consent statutes
contain no age floor, surely there must be some level at which the physician
should be placed in the position of questioning individual patient competence
to consent because of youth. In short, even under the broader of today's
statutes some subjective evaluation by the physician probably will be necessary, and some judicial interpretation may be required of statutes in which
this was not anticipated. The question ultimately becomes one of how much
discretion we wish to posit in the medical profession, and not just with the
minor patient. This raises the concern of possible physician overreaching in
the extension of unnecessary or undesirable medical services to minors. At
the moment this does not seem to be considered a threat, and the principal
emphasis is on enabling minors to get to physicians who will be able to treat
them without fear of civil liability except in instances of negligence.

